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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1332(a).
On November 26, 2017, the district court dismissed all claims against
Defendant with leave to amend. ER2-ER27.1 On January 19, 2018, Plaintiff
Kristanalea Dyroff filed a Notice of Intent Not to File an Amended Complaint.
CD31. On that same day, the district court entered judgement in favor of Defendant
and against Plaintiff, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. ER1. The
dismissal and order of judgment gave this Court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Plaintiff timely appealed on February 2, 2018. ER28-ER31.
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Defendant designed its website to identify the meaning of, and intent

behind, its users’ posts. Defendant used that information to infer characteristics
about those users and to pair them with other users who shared related
characteristics. Defendant used this functionality to identify Wesley Greer as a
heroin addict, and to steer him to posts made by heroin dealers on its website. Did
the district court err in holding that Defendant’s promotion of posts involving the

“ER__” denotes the Excerpts of Record, while “CD__” denotes numbered entries
in the district court clerk’s docket.
1

1
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sale of heroin did not make it responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information related to those posts?
2.

The CEO of Defendant’s website publicly stated that he had elected to

shut the website down in order to avoid law enforcement requests related to unlawful
user activity. Did the district court err in holding that this statement, along with
Defendant’s anonymity policy for its users, did not make it responsible, in whole or
in part, for the creation or development of information related to unlawful posts that
it fostered on its website?
3.

Defendant’s website identified Wesley Greer as a heroin addict and

steered him towards posts advertising the sale of heroin. Among those were posts
from Hugo Margenat-Castro, a man Defendant knew to be under investigation for
selling fentanyl and who had been arrested several times for having done so. With
this knowledge, Defendant identified Wesley Greer as a heroin addict and purposely
directed him to Margenat-Castro, from whom Mr. Greer purchased a fatal dose of
fentanyl, advertised as heroin. Did the district court err in holding that Defendant’s
misfeasance did not create a risk to Mr. Greer and therefore that it owed him no duty
of care?
4.

Did the district court err in holding that Defendant owed no duty of care

to Wesley Greer as an invitee?

2
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III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a complaint’s dismissal under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th
Cir. 2011). “Dismissal is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory or
an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro
v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). To survive a motion to dismiss, the
complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Taylor v. Yee, 780 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). “The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqball,
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557). The Court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as
true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citation and quotation omitted).

3
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IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction

Plaintiff Kristanalea Dyroff seeks to hold Defendant2 liable for its role in the
death of her son, Wesley Greer. Until shutting down in March 2016, Defendant’s
social network website was a haven for drug traffickers and, correspondingly, a peril
for vulnerable addicts. Defendant did not serve as a passive conduit for the drug
sales. Instead, it contributed to these unlawful enterprises in multiple, material ways.
First, through

its

recommendations

functionality—which

drew on

Defendant’s specific knowledge of its users, obtained via algorithms, data mining
technology, and inferences drawn from the demographic characteristics—Defendant
identified vulnerable addicts and steered them through an echo chamber, pushing
those users into continued contact with dealers through groups with names such as
“I Need Heroin” and “I Can Help With Connect in Orlando FL.” Defendant also

2

Plaintiff filed this action against the following entities: Experience Project,
Kanjoya, Inc. (“Kanjoya”), and Ultimate Software Group, Inc. (“Ultimate Software
Group”). ER32-ER88. Ultimate Software Group purchased all of the interests in
Experience Project from Kanjoya in 2016, and Kanjoya was subsequently merged
with Ultimate Software Group. Because Ultimate Software Group is the only one
of the three entities currently in existence, Plaintiff dismissed her claims against
Experience Project and Kanjoya in the underlying litigation without prejudice.
CD18. Although Ultimate Software Group is the Defendant, the acts and practices
detailed herein arise from Experience Project. Accordingly, Plaintiff refers to all
three entities as either “Experience Project” or “Defendant.”
4
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oversaw a messaging functionality that would connect addicts with dealers and
would alert addicts to new posts in groups related to the sale of drugs.
Second, Defendant’s content generation guidelines were developed to assure
anonymity of users, which fact was seized upon by dealers. This decision was not
neutral—Defendant publicly stated that it sought to preserve online anonymity of its
users, at least in part, to combat law enforcement investigations and requests for
information. Indeed, once those requests for information became voluminous (given
the ubiquity of criminal activity on Defendant’s website), Defendant shuttered the
site rather than aid any investigations.
Plaintiff’s son was a victim of the environment created and maintained by
Defendant. In August of 2015, Wesley, a recovering heroin addict, established an
account with Defendant’s website and, like other vulnerable users, was steered
towards multiple groups devoted to the sale of heroin. Subsequently, he was steered
towards a man named Hugo Margenat-Castro, from whom he purchased what he
believed to be heroin, but what was in reality fentanyl, a lethal substance 50 times
more potent than heroin. That lack of knowledge led to Wesley’s overdose and death
on August 19, 2015. While Wesley did not know that Margenat-Castro sold
fentanyl, Defendant did know or should have known. Margenat-Castro was the
subject of multiple controlled buys and arrests from various law enforcement
agencies throughout 2015, and the investigations surrounding those arrests led
5

Case: 18-15175, 06/13/2018, ID: 10907234, DktEntry: 12, Page 15 of 62
Dyroff v. The Ultimate Software Group – No. 18-15175

authorities to Defendant’s website, and led to numerous requests from law
enforcement related to Margenat-Castro.

Therefore, prior to Wesley’s death,

Defendant knew or should have known not only that Margenat-Castro was
trafficking drugs on Experience Project, but that he was trafficking fentanyl. Had
Defendant warned Wesley of this fact, he would not have overdosed and died.
B.

Factual Background
i.

The Experience Project Website

Experience Project was a social networking website active from 2007 until
March 2016. ER38:¶18. The website consisted of various “online communities” or
“groups” that were formed by members based on common interests or attributes. Id.
Users were required to register with the site in order to join these communities or
groups, but per the website’s policy they did so anonymously. ER38:¶19, ER46:¶36ER48:¶42. Once a user joined a group, he or she could post questions or comments
to that group or respond to another user’s comments or questions. ER39:¶21.
This user interaction generated revenue for Experience Project in several
ways. ER39:¶22. First, the website served ads to its users. Id. Second, users could
buy “tokens” that they could then use to ask other members questions. ER41:¶25.
Third, the website used data mining techniques, including the use of machine
learning models, to analyze its users’ posts, divining the content (by “assessing entire
sentence structures”) as well as the underlying emotions associated with the posts.
6
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ER39:¶22, ER40:¶23. Defendant used the information created from that data mining
for several purposes, including selling the data sets to various third parties (ER39ER40:¶22, citing http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/wp2017-01.pdf),
but also using what it learned about its users to steer them to other groups, in order
to keep them engaged on the site (ER41:¶27-ER42:¶28). Experience Project would
identify these additional groups and tailor them to individual users through its
recommendations functionality. Id. This recommendations functionality would take
data that Experience Project gleaned from its users—including the content of a given
group, the content posted by users within the group, the demographic data known by
Experience Project about a given user (including geographic location)—and would
then compile that data and draw inferences from that compilation about what other
interactions a user might seek on the website. Id. All of these data points were
derived, bundled, maintained, and used for Defendant’s commercial gain. Id.
In part because of its opportunity for anonymous-yet-public dialogue,
Experience Project became a popular medium for drug dealers and drug addicts.
ER41:¶26-ER45:¶35, ER47:¶41-ER48:¶42. Defendant did not sit idly by as these
two demographic groups sought each other out.

Instead, through its

recommendations functionality, Defendant first identified and the tempted
vulnerable drug addicts with continual entreaties to connect with drug dealers, thus
encouraging further interactions (and valuable data generated therefrom) through the
7
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website’s feedback loop. ER41:¶26-ER45:¶35 Among the drugs that were trafficked
on the website were heroin and other opiates. ER42:¶30.
Experience Project facilitated this activity with full knowledge. It was aware
of the dangerous and unlawful sale of drugs on its property, both through the data it
acquired and utilized in the course of its mining and manipulation of users’ posts
(ER46:¶38) and as the result of myriad requests for information from law
enforcement, which arose from separate criminal investigations and/or prosecutions
related to the illegal activity perpetrated on the website. ER47:¶39-ER48:¶42,
ER54:¶65-¶68, ER56:¶71, ER56:¶73, ER54:n.13. Concerning the latter, eventually
the requests from law enforcement became too much, and Experience Project elected
to shut the website down rather than aid investigations into criminal activity.
ER47:¶39-ER48:¶42. On March 21, 2016, the website posted an open letter to its
users, stating that a “deep[]” and “troubling trend[]” threatened the website;
specifically, “[o]nline anonymity, a core part of EP, is being challenged like never
before. Governments and their agencies are aggressively attacking the foundations
of internet privacy with a deluge of information requests, subpoenas, and warrants.”
ER47:¶41. Accordingly, the website announced that it would be “taking a break.”
Id.

8
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ii.

The Death of Wesley Greer

Wesley Greer was a recovering heroin addict, having become addicted to the
drug following an over-prescription of opiates after a sports injury in college.
ER49:¶44-¶48. After multiple attempts at rehabilitation, Wesley had managed to
stay clean beginning in August, 2013, following a 9-month stay at a treatment
facility. ER49:¶46. In February, 2015, Wesley moved to Brunswick, Georgia, with
his mother and stepfather who wanted to support Wesley in his recovery. ER49:¶48.
However, in August 2015, Wesley succumbed, conducting a web search to find
heroin that led him to the Experience Project site. ER50:¶49. He then registered for
an account, paid for tokens to ask questions of other users, and began posting to
groups related to the sale of heroin. ER50:¶49-¶50.

Subsequently, through

Experience Project’s messaging functionality, the website directly alerted Wesley to
new posts in these groups. ER50:¶52.
At or around this time, a fellow Experience Project user, Hugo MargenatCastro, had been posting in multiple groups under the alias “Potheadjuice,”
purporting to sell heroin.

In reality, Margenat-Castro was selling fentanyl, a

synthetic opioid that is 50 times more potent than heroin and is a substance so toxic
that a dose the size of three grains of sugar is fatal to an adult. ER50:¶53-¶54,
ER51:¶58. Margenat-Castro sold pure fentanyl and/or heroin laced with fentanyl,
used Experience Project as his exclusive vehicle for drug sales, and availed himself
9
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not only of its anonymity policy and content guideline, but also of its
recommendations and messaging functionality, as well as its antipathy towards
requests for information from law enforcement about criminal activity on the site.
ER52:¶59. Margenat-Castro sold drugs five sales a day, seven days a week, from
January 1, 2015 until October 1, 2015.
ER52:n.12.

ER51:¶58, ER52:¶60, ER52:n.11,

He did this exclusively through Experience Project, which is

corroborated by an almost 1:1 ratio of profile views to drug sales. ER52:¶60,
ER52:n.11, ER52:n.12.
Since January, 2015, multiple law enforcement agencies had targeted
Margenat-Castro for his drug trafficking on Experience Project, conducting
controlled buys and effecting subsequent arrests multiple times in the Spring and
Summer of 2015. ER51:¶61. In the course of these investigations during this time
period, Experience Project would or should have had actual knowledge of MargenatCastro’s illegal activities on the website—including the fact that he was selling
fentanyl despite his representations that he was simply selling heroin. ER54:¶65¶66, ER54:n.13.
On or about the night of August 17, 2015, Wesley made contact with
Margenat-Castro, via Experience Project, and arranged to buy what he believed to
be heroin. ER50:¶55. In reality, he had purchased a lethal dose of fentanyl. Id. On
the evening of August 18, 2015, Wesley ingested the drugs he had purchased.
10
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ER51:¶56. By August 19, 2015, at 11:55 A.M., Wesley was declared dead of
fentanyl toxicity; his death was listed as a homicide. ER51:¶57.
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff Kristanalea Dyroff, individually and on behalf of her son’s estate,
filed a lawsuit against Defendants Ultimate Software Group, Experience Project, and
Kanjoya, Inc. in California Superior Court on August 16, 2017. ER32-ER88. Her
complaint advanced seven claims: negligence (Count One), wrongful death (Count
Two), premises liability (Count Three), failure to warn (Count Four), civil
conspiracy (Count Five), unjust enrichment (Count Six), and violation of the Drug
Dealer Liability Act, Cal. Health and Safety Code §§ 11700, et seq. (Count Seven).
ER56-ER67 Subsequently, Defendant Ultimate Software Group filed a Notice of
Removal on September 15, 2017. CD1. Shortly thereafter, Defendant Ultimate
Software Group moved to dismiss the Complaint (CD13); Plaintiff opposed (CD15);
and Defendant filed its reply (CD16). The district court heard oral argument on
November 2, 2017 (CD20), and on November 26, 2017 it issued an order granting
Defendant’s motion to dismiss and allowing Plaintiff leave to amend (ER2-ER27).
Plaintiff timely appealed on February 2, 2018. ER28-ER31.
B. The Ruling Below
For all of Plaintiff’s claims except for her failure to warn claim, the district
court held that Defendant was entitled to immunity under Section 230 of the
11
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Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”). ER3. In the
court’s view, Plaintiff’s claims sought to hold Defendant (a website) liable for
content posted by third parties, which is precluded by Section 230. ER3. Although
Plaintiff asserted that her claims did not arise from third-party content, but rather
from specific behavior and functionality on the part of the website,3 the court
disagreed, finding that “only third parties posted information on Experience Project,
and the website operator did not solicit unlawful information or otherwise create or
develop content.” ER16.
The district court also rejected Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s policies
and procedures knowingly sanctioned, aided, and abetted the illegal activity on its
website, thereby helping “develop” the content and precluding Section 230
immunity. ER18-ER20. Although Plaintiff provided a statement from the website’s
founder announcing that he was shuttering the site because of “troubling trends”
related to law enforcement interest in the website and its users’ illegal activity,
resulting in “a deluge of information requests, subpoenas, and warrants,” the court
held that this was not a sufficient indicium that the website condoned and enabled

3

As the district court correctly summarized, Plaintiff alleged that Experience Project
“used ‘data mining’ techniques and ‘machine learning’ algorithms and tools to
collect, analyze and ‘learn[] the meaning and intent behind posts’ in order to
‘recommend’ and ‘steer’ vulnerable users, like her son, to forums frequented by drug
users and dealers.” ER15. Plaintiff challenged these acts and practices, which
“‘created an environment where vulnerable addicts were subjected to a feedback
loop of continual entreaties to connect with drug dealers.’” Id.
12
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its users’ bad acts. ER19. The court reached a different inference, finding “[t]he
statement manifest[ed] a concern with Internet privacy…and does not establish
antipathy to law enforcement.” Id. The website’s “policy about anonymity may have
allowed illegal conduct,” the court held, but ultimately neither the policy nor the
“neutral tools [that] facilitated user communications” could be said to “‘create’ or
‘develop’ information, even in part.” Id. Accordingly, in the court’s view, Section
230 foreclosed all of Plaintiff’s claims save for her failure to warn claim.
The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim4 on the grounds
that no duty was owed to Wesley Greer by Defendant, either because of a special
relationship between the parties or because of the website’s role in creating the risks
that gave rise to his overdose and homicide. ER20-ER26. Concerning the former
point, the court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that social media websites “are ‘the
twenty-first century equivalent of a brick and mortar business…like restaurants,
bars,…amusement parks, and all businesses open to the public,’” holding that “[t]his
makes no sense practically. Imposing a duty at best would result in a weak and
ineffective general warning to all users.” ER24. Further, imposing a duty of care
would be inappropriate as “[r]isk can be more apparent in the real world than in the
virtual social-network world.” ER25. Concerning a duty imposed as a result of the

As stated by the district court, Plaintiff contended that Defendant “had a duty to
warn Mr. Greer that Mr. Margenat-Castro was selling fentanyl-laced heroin via the
Experience Project website.” ER20.
4
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website’s pushing drug addicts to engage with drug dealers (i.e., its misfeasance),
the court held that Defendant’s “use of the neutral tools and functionalities on its
website did not create a risk of harm that imposes an ordinary duty of care.” ER26.
The court dismissed all claims with leave to amend. ER27.
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court erred in three respects.
First, it mischaracterized Experience Project’s recommendations functionality

and push notifications—which in the instant matter identified a vulnerable heroin
addict and relentlessly steered him to a known drug trafficker—as “content-neutral
tools” worthy of Section 230 Immunity. Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate
that the website was specifically designed to make subjective, editorial decisions
about users based on their posts. Although the website could classify users in benign
categories (e.g., “I’m going to Stanford”) it also was able to (and did) identify and
categorize users according to characteristics that were both unlawful and, more
importantly, profoundly harmful to those grouped individuals. This conduct was
particularly dangerous—and far from neutral—because Experience Project would
then steer the users it identified as heroin addicts to users it had identified as heroin
dealers, thereby facilitating a drug deal.
It cannot be overstated that the Defendant professed to know exactly what
each of its users were posting and what the intent was behind each post. The conduct
14
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Plaintiff challenged is therefore not a neutral action wholly reliant on third-party
inputs, but instead the product of a series of knowing, deliberate acts, unlawfully and
independently undertaken by Defendant and Defendant, alone. Indeed, neither the
drug-trafficker user nor the drug-addict user had any control over the functionality
challenged by Plaintiff; Margenat-Castro could not have steered Wesley Greer to his
posts even if he tried.

The agency lay exclusively with Defendant.

Under

controlling Ninth Circuit authority, such deliberate acts are not subject to Section
230 immunity, and instead clearly evidence the development, on the part of the
website, of its own, harmful content.
Second, the district court erred in refusing to credit Plaintiff’s well-pleaded
allegations that Experience Project not only knew of the activity occurring on the
website, but condoned the bad acts and even colluded with the bad actors using the
site, through its posting policies and through its stated antipathy towards law
enforcement. Although the district court was presented with a public statement by
Experience Project’s CEO that he was shuttering the website due to a “deluge of
information requests, subpoenas, and warrants” (rather than aid authorities), it
declined to draw the entirely plausible and logical inference that such a statement
indicated sympathy for users who were the subject of those requests (including
Margenat-Castro) and antipathy towards law enforcement. Rather, and improperly,
the district court explained this away as “a concern with Internet privacy that has
15
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been widespread in the technology sector.” This refusal to draw all inferences in
Plaintiff’s favor—particularly when courts have done so under nearly identical
circumstances when applying this Court’s law—is reversible error.
Third, the district court erred in finding that Defendant owed no duty to warn
Wesley Greer of what it already knew from multiple, previous requests from law
enforcement: that Margenat-Castro was trafficking not in heroin, but rather in pure
fentanyl (a substance 50 times more deadly). This is incorrect for two reasons. First,
under California law, a defendant owes a duty to warn of a danger created by his
own misfeasance. The dangers endemic to Defendant’s website were of Defendant’s
own making and were not the result of “neutral” tools, as the district court
improperly held.

Second, even if the risk did not arise from Defendant’s

misfeasance, it nonetheless owed Wesley Greer a duty under time-honored legal
principles. Experience Project, a social media website where users are encouraged
to congregate and interact, is the twenty-first century equivalent of a brick-andmortar establishment such as restaurants, bars, theaters, fairs, auditoriums, stadiums,
amusement parks, and all other businesses open to the public. Under California law,
a business establishment must exercise reasonable care for the safety of its invitees
and is liable for injuries resulting from a breach of this duty.

16
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VI.

ARGUMENT
A. The District Court Erred in Holding That Defendant Was Not
Responsible, in Whole or In Part, for the Creation or Development
of the Posts Facilitating Heroin Trafficking on Its Website.

The district court incorrectly held that Section 230 precluded Plaintiff’s
claims, misconstruing the statute to mean that a challenge the website’s
recommendations functionality – which used algorithms and machine learning to
identify heroin and then steer them towards heroin dealers – amounted to a challenge
of “neutral tools” of the website. This misreads the Court’s unambiguous authority
on the scope of Section 230 immunity and fundamentally misunderstands the nature
and purpose of algorithms, which despite being computer code are nonetheless
suffused with their designer’s intent.
Where, like here, a website is designed to intentionally perform a specific act,
and this act is what gives rise to a plaintiff’s claim, Section 230 immunity does not
apply. Accordingly, the district court should be reversed.
i.

The Scope of Section 230 Immunity Delineated By This
Court

Section 230 states, in relevant part, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(c)(1). The
statute defines an “interactive computer service” as “any information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by
17
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multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by
libraries or educational institutions.” Id. at § 230(f)(2).
In contrast to an interactive computer service, an “information content
provider” is “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service.”

Id. at § 230(f)(3).

Neither “creation” nor

“development” is defined in the statute.
This Court holds that Section 230 bars a plaintiff’s claim against (1) a provider
of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat as a publisher
(3) of information provided by another information content provider. Barnes v.
Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2009).

Consistent with the

definitions laid out in the statute, if the defendant website had no hand in “the
creation or development” of content posted on the website, then it has immunity
under Section 230, as it is an “interactive computer service.” Fair Housing Council
of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc). If, on the other hand, it had a role in creating or developing the
content at issue, it becomes an “information content provider,” and Section 230 does
not apply. Id.

18
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While this Court has described the scope of Section 230’s immunity in
broad terms, it has also made clear that the statute does not “create a lawless noman’s-land on the internet.” Id. at 1164.5
1. When a Website Materially Manipulates Third-Party
Content, Creating Additional Content Therefrom, It
“Develops” That Content and Has No Immunity
Under Section 230.
The key authority in this Court that outlines the scope of Section 230
immunity is Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com. This
opinion held that a website “develops” content otherwise posted by third parties (and
thus loses Section 230 immunity) when it materially manipulates that content,
including by passively directing its creation or by improperly using the content, after
the fact. 521 F.3d at 1168.
The defendant, Roommates.com, was a website designed to match people
looking to share housing. Id. at 1161. In order to post or search for listings a user
would have to create an account profile, in which they were required to disclose
personal information including sex, family status, and sexual orientation. Id. Users
could search for and view other profiles based on the characteristics in those profiles,

5

See, also, Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir. May 31, 2016)
(“[T]he CDA does not declare a general immunity from liability deriving from
third-party content.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
19
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and based on the criteria they either posted or viewed, exchange emails with other
users via the website. Id.
The Fair Housing Councils of the San Fernando Valley and San Diego sued
the website for violating multiple housing discrimination laws, challenging the
website’s requirement that users include age, sex, and family status in their profiles
and also challenging the website’s use of those potentially discriminatory profiles in
its search functionality and email notification system. Id. at 1162, 1165. The
website claimed that its practices were shielded by Section 230, as the plaintiffs’
challenges amounted to grievances over content that was posted by its users, who
were the true “information content providers” in the transaction, and that the website
itself was merely a passive conduit for those posts. Id.
This Court disagreed—while it was true that the posts were created by third
parties, “the fact that users are information content providers does not preclude
Roommate from also being an information content provider by helping ‘develop’ at
least ‘in part’ the information in the profiles.” Id. at 1165. (emphasis original). One
dispositive data point was that the website was designed to guide users to disclose
data about themselves that could lead to discrimination in their housing options. Id.
This functionality, coded into the website, “materially contribute[d]” to the “alleged
unlawfulness,” such that the website became a co-developer of the content, and thus

20
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became an “information content provider” that was beyond the protection of Section
230. Id.
Additionally, this Court held that the website “[was] not entitled to CDA
immunity for the operation of its search system, which filters listings, or of its email
notification system, which directs emails to subscribers according to discriminatory
criteria.” Id. at 1167.6 The Court distinguished the defendant website’s unlawful
search and notification functionalities from those of “ordinary search engines,”
noting that the latter “do not use unlawful criteria to limit the scope of searches
conducted on them, nor are they designed to achieve illegal ends.” 521 F.3d at 1167.
Since “Roommate's search function is…designed to steer users based on [unlawful]
criteria…[it] differs materially from generic search engines such as Google, Yahoo!
and MSN Live Search, in that Roommate designed its system to use allegedly
unlawful criteria so as to limit the results of each search, and to force users to
participate in its [unlawful] process.” Id.

This transposes identically to the facts at bar, as Plaintiff alleges that “Experience
Project’s recommendations functionality…—written into the website’s source
code—relied on data such as, but not limited to, the content of a given group, the
content posted by the users within the group, and demographic data known by
Experience Project about the given user, including the geographic location of the
user. In point of fact, this was expressly admitted by [Experience Project CEO]:
‘Immediately, you’re drawn into groups that are structured around these
experiences [that the user identifies as being relevant to himself or herself.’” Compl.
at ¶ 28.
6
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Roommates

established

a

nuanced

standard

of

what

constitutes

“development” of content under Section 230, which becomes critical for
distinguishing an “interactive computer service” (who has immunity) from an
“information content provider” (who does not). The Court focused on the word
“development” in the definition of an “information content provider”7 and cautioned
not to “ignore[] the words ‘development…in part’ in the statutory passage
‘creation or development in whole or in part.’” Id. at 1167 (quoting 47 U.S.C. §
230(f)(3)) (emphasis original). Thus, a defendant website need not author the
material at issue; instead, directing its development is enough to make that website
an “information content provider.” Id.
Critically, the Roommates opinion explained the “definition of ‘development’
that is [most] suitable to the context in which we operate [is the definition] ‘making
usable or available.’” Id. at 1168. Under this standard, a website can be a developer
without having created the content at issue so long as it makes its own use of that
content in some material way. Id. Indisputably, under this authority, a website can
face liability when it takes an active role in guiding the creation of content or in
using that content for recommendations or email functionality (i.e., steering users
throughout the platform). See, generally, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).

“[A]ny person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). (emphasis added)
7
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Equally instructive is Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Cal.
2006) a district court opinion that predates Roommates but that was cited
approvingly by this Court in its Roommates analysis. 521 F.3d at 1163, n.8 (citing
Anthony, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257).8 In Anthony, an aggrieved user of Yahoo’s dating
site accused the company of (1) creating fraudulent user profiles sent to lure
prospective customers, and (2) sending profiles of actual former subscribers, whose
subscriptions had lapsed, to current members of the service. Id. Concerning the
former business practice, the district court held that Yahoo was an “information
content provider” as it allegedly created the profiles at issue. Id. at 1262. Moreover,
concerning the profiles from lapsed accounts, the court held that “[a]dmittedly, third
parties created these profiles. Nevertheless, the CDA only entitles Yahoo! not to be
‘the publisher or speaker’ of the profiles. It does not absolve Yahoo! from liability
for any accompanying misrepresentations. Because Anthony posits that Yahoo!'s
manner of presenting the profiles – not the underlying profiles themselves –
constitute fraud, the CDA does not apply.” Id. at 1263 (emphasis added).
Since Roommates, this Court has continued to hold that claims involving
third-party website content do not automatically trigger Section 230 immunities.

Specifically, the Court cited Anthony for the proposition that “a website may be
immune from liability for some of the content it displays to the public but be subject
to liability for other content.” Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1162-63 (citing Anthony v.
Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262-63 (N.D. Cal. 2006)).
8

23

Case: 18-15175, 06/13/2018, ID: 10907234, DktEntry: 12, Page 33 of 62
Dyroff v. The Ultimate Software Group – No. 18-15175

Instead, where the claim focuses on conduct of the website that is separate from the
third-party content, a claim is not precluded even if it indisputably relates to or is
intertwined with that third-party content. For example, in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.,
570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009), a woman brought suit over a website’s failure to
remove nude photos of her posted by her ex-boyfriend. Id. at 1098. While this Court
held that Section 230 precluded the plaintiff’s negligence claim arising from the
company’s allowing the photos to be published in the first instance (id. at 1105-06),
the Court simultaneously held that a separate, promissory estoppel claim was not
precluded, where Yahoo had made representations to the plaintiff that it would,
indeed, remove the content (id. at 1107-09).

Although the estoppel claim

unquestionably related to content posted by third parties, it arose from actions
undertaken by Yahoo that were independent of the content’s posting in the first
place. Id.9
Courts in other jurisdictions follow Roommates and make this same, correct,
distinction—recognizing that challenging a defendant’s conduct vis-à-vis third-party
content does not automatically equate to treating the website as a “publisher.” See,
e.g., FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 2009) (no Section

9

See, also Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2016) (failure
to warn claim related to third-party posters on a website not afforded Section 230
immunity because the duty existed independently of, and had no bearing on, any
specific third-party content); Beckman v. Match.com, LLC, 668 F. App'x 759 (9th
Cir. 2016) (same).
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230 immunity when defendant “solicited requests” for telephone record information,
“paid researchers to find it, [and] knew that the researchers were likely to use
improper methods,” since its “actions were not ‘neutral’ with respect to generating
offensive content; on the contrary, its actions were intended to generate such
content.”) (citing to Fair Housing multiple times in its analysis).10
The most factually apposite application of Roommates is a Washington state
court case—J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC—in which three minor girls
who were victims of sex trafficking sued Backpage.com, a website catering to online
escort services that was used by the girls’ pimps. 184 Wash. 2d 95, 359 P.3d 714
(2015) (en banc). The plaintiffs argued that Section 230 did not immunize the
defendant from their claims,11 as they alleged that the defendant’s posting policies

10

See, also City of Chicago, Ill. v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010)
(no Section 230 immunity for ticket-seller website accused of posting and selling
tickets without remitting proper taxes, because claim relating to collection of
“Chicago’s amusement tax does not depend on who ‘publishes’ any information or
is a ‘speaker,’”); Lansing v. Sw. Airlines Co., 980 N.E.2d 630, 639 (Ill. App. Ct.
2012) (Airline that allowed its employee to access customer information in its
computer systems and harass customers could not claim Section 230 immunity
because “Plaintiff’s negligent supervision cause of action does not require
publishing or speaking as a critical element, and holding defendant liable for its
failure to supervise its employee after defendant had received notice of the
employee’s wrongful conduct does not treat defendant as if it were the publisher or
speaker of the alleged [harassing] e-mails and texts.”).
11
The plaintiffs asserted claims for negligence, outrage, sexual exploitation of
children, ratification/vicarious liability, unjust enrichment, invasion of privacy,
sexual assault and battery, and civil conspiracy. J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings,
LLC, 184 Wash. 2d 95, 98-99, 359 P.3d 714, 716 (2015).
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and site functionality were specifically designed, in whole or in part, to help their
pimps evade detection from law enforcement. Id. at 716. Citing extensively to
Roommates throughout, the Washington Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs’
allegations that Backpage “intentionally developed its website,” including through
developing its content guidelines and functionality, to such a degree that it evidenced
collusion (and thus a co-development relationship) between the website and the
pimps who trafficked the underage girls. Id. at 717-18. The Washington Supreme
Court reversed the lower court’s grant of the motion to dismiss, stating that further
fact-finding was warranted “to ascertain whether in fact Backpage designed its
posting rules to induce sex trafficking” and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Id at 718.12
Roommates and its progeny make clear that a website need not co-author a
third party’s post to have “developed” the content pursuant to Section 230; it is

12

Plaintiff recognizes that the First Circuit reached the opposite conclusion under
similar facts and with similar arguments. See, generally, Doe v. Backpage.com,
LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016). This opinion is distinguishable, however, as the
First Circuit was bound by different precedent employing an especially (and in
Plaintiff’s view, improperly) broad reading of Section 230 immunity. Id. at 21, n.5
(“The appellants argue that a concurring opinion in J.S. v. Village Voice Media
Holdings, L.L.C., 184 Wn.2d 95, 359 P.3d 714, 718-24 (Wash. 2015) (en banc)
(Wiggins, J., concurring), points to a different conclusion. But our reasoning in
[Universal Commun. Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007)] — which
the J.S. concurrence failed to address — defeats this argument.”). The proper
analytic framework in this Court, of course, is set forth in Roommates, which Doe v.
Backpage.com does not address, much less reconcile.
26
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enough that the website manipulates the content in a unique way. This manipulation
can take myriad forms, including guiding the content’s generation, either through
posting guidelines that signal or direct the poster,13 content requirements for posts,14
or even post hoc use of content that was generated either in whole or in part by a
third party.15
These authorities reflect a nuanced standard set by this Court, which
recognizes that websites have changed dramatically since passing of the
Communications Decency Act. Most websites no longer passively “publish” a
user’s post to a static message board, and thus no longer serve as a mere “passive
conduit” for the message. In certain circumstances, such as with social media
networks like Experience Project, the relationship between the website and its users
is more symbiotic, with the website taking the users’ input and making its own
derived content, then using that content for its own functionality and purpose.
ii.

The District Court Misapplied Roommates by Holding That
the Recommendations Functionality That Knowingly
Matched Heroin Addicts to Heroin Dealers Was a “Neutral
Tool,” as Opposed to an Instance of Independently
Developed Content.

In light of the rule established by Roommates and its progeny, the district court
was incorrect in holding that Experience Project’s manipulation of site content (and

13

Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1164; J.S., 359 P.3d at 717-18.
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1164.
15
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1164; Anthony, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
14
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its users) did not rise to the level of “information content provider” activity. The
court erroneously classified the recommendations and push notifications, which
identified heroin addicts and steered them towards heroin dealers, as “contentneutral tools” and (equally erroneously) held that it was immaterial that their intent
was to steer vulnerable users towards unlawful content.

ER16.

The court’s

reasoning was threefold: “[f]irst, making recommendations to website users and
alerting them to posts are ordinary, neutral functions of social-network
websites[;]16…[s]econd, it is the users’ voluntary inputs that create the content on
Experience

Project,

not

Ultimate

Software’s

proprietary

algorithms17[;

and]…[t]hird, the result holds even when a website collects information about users
and classifies user characteristics.”18 None of these points is correct, factually or
legally.
1. The Functionality Challenged by Plaintiff Involved
Case-By-Case, Subjective Determinations On the Part
of the Website and Its Programmers, and Cannot Be
Classified as “Neutral.”
First, the act of making a recommendation is, by definition, not “neutral.”
The district court held that “Ms. Dyroff does not plausibly allege that Ultimate
Software ‘promoted the use of [its neutral] tools for unlawful purposes,” ER17

16

ER16
ER17
18
ER18
17
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(citing Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174 n. 37) (alterations in the original), but this
ignores the specific allegations in the Complaint and stretches the word “neutral” to
its breaking point.19 Instead, Defendant used its website’s proprietary technology to
identify Wesley Greer as a heroin addict, search through posts it knew pertained to
the sale of heroin, and prod him—through its own, separate content—towards those
posts. ER41:¶26-ER45:¶35; ER50:¶49-¶50; ER50:¶52. An example of what Wesley
Greer saw is as follows:

Merriam Webster defines “neutral” as “not engaged on either side” and “not
decided or pronounced as to characteristics: indifferent.” (https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/neutral) (last visited June 12, 2018)
19
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Fig. 120
As the above demonstrates, Experience Project’s recommendations functionality
(shown in the bottom right corner of figure 1) was purposefully designed to engage
in deliberate decision-making, and to present users with custom content, generated
by Experience Project based on the decisions the website made. The act of making
a recommendation is deliberative—it requires evaluating (1) the subject matter being
recommended and (2) the person to whom the recommendation is being made, and
making choices in light of those evaluations.
To call Experience Project’s machine learning and algorithmic functionality
“neutral” fundamentally misunderstands algorithms, their origin, and their purpose.
Algorithms are portions of code, programmed by individuals to achieve the goals of
those individuals—specifically, for the code to make decisions as those individuals’
proxy. Because algorithms are the product of human endeavor, they carry all of the
complexities and deliberation of human decision-making (and attendant room for
error and even illegal results). This is an acknowledged problem, for instance, in the
field of hiring practices and employment law. As one recent article noted, algorithms
risk adopting human biases and, accordingly, effecting unlawful results:
At their core, algorithms mimic human decision making.
They are typically trained to learn from past successes,
which may embed existing bias. For example, in a famous
20
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experiment, recruiters reviewed identical resumes and
selected more applicants with white-sounding names than
with black-sounding ones. If the algorithm learns what a
“good” hire looks like based on that kind of biased data, it
will make biased hiring decisions. The result is that
automatic resume screening software often evaluates job
applicants based on subjective criteria, such as one’s
name. By latching on to the wrong features, this approach
discounts the candidate’s true potential.
Gideon Mann and Cathy O’Neil, “Hiring Algorithms Are Not Neutral.” Harvard
Business Review (Dec. 9, 2016) (available at https://hbr.org/2016/12/hiringalgorithms-are-not-neutral) (last visited June 6, 2018). The authors stress that
“[a]lgorithms are, in part, our opinions embedded in code.” Id. “In other words,
algorithms are not neutral.” Id. (emphasis added).
It is not speculative that biases inherent in algorithms lead to unlawfully
discriminatory conduct that exists completely outside of Section 230’s scope.
Another article addressing this issue provides an empirical example:
In one study, Harvard professor Latanya Sweeney looked
at the Google AdSense ads that came up during searches
of names associated with white babies (Geoffrey, Jill,
Emma) and names associated with black babies
(DeShawn, Darnell, Jermaine). She found that ads
containing the word “arrest” were shown next to more than
80 percent of “black” name searches but fewer than 30
percent of “white” name searches….Sweeney worries that
the ways Google’s advertising technology perpetuates
racial bias could undermine a black person’s chances in a
competition, whether it’s for an award, a date, or a job.
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Nanette Byrnes, “Why We Should Expect Algorithms to Be Biased,” MIT
Technology

Review

(Jun.

24,

2016)

(available

at

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601775/why-we-should-expect-algorithmsto-be-biased/) (last visited June 6, 2018). In the above study, Google’s algorithms
made deliberate, and discriminatory, choices of how to present third-party-generated
content to individual users based on what it new or inferred about the users (through
their search terms). Clearly, its “tools” (i.e., its algorithms) were anything but
“neutral” in the presentation of this third-party-generated content.
The same holds true for Experience Project’s functionalities challenged by
Plaintiff in this litigation. As pled in the Complaint, Experience Project’s unlawful
activity took the form of, inter alia, (1) specifically identifying the meaning of and
intent behind each and every post on its website;21 (2) using that derived information
to create new content that would manipulate individual users and funnel them into
pockets of activity on the website, including harmful, drug-trafficking activity; (3)
shielding bad actors from law enforcement requests (through both the blanket
anonymity policy in its posting guidelines and its express antipathy towards law
enforcement information requests); and (4) developing policies and procedures (and

21

ER39:¶ 22 (citing http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/wp2017-01.pdf).
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engineering its software) to effectuate these goals.22 These actions—accepted as
true, taken as a whole, and interpreted with all inferences drawn in Plaintiff’s favor—
more than plausibly assert that Experience Project used its “tools for unlawful
purposes”23 and that those tools were not neutral. On the above facts, Plaintiff
readily satisfied the pleadings requirements at the motion to dismiss stage. Ashcroft
v. Iqball, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (“The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557).
These facts also demonstrate the inapposite nature of the authority relied upon
by the district court in its analysis. The court cited to a troika of cases for the
proposition that website functionality is a “neutral tool.”

ER16-ER17 citing

Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Fields v. Twitter,
Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp.
3d 140 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2017). However, each of those cases distills to a claim

22

See, e.g., ER34¶ 6-ER35:¶8, ER38:¶19, ER39:¶22-ER40:¶23, ER41:¶26ER48:¶42, ER50:¶52-¶53, ER55:¶70-ER56:¶71, ER56:¶73-ER57:¶74, ER61:¶94ER62:¶96, ER63:¶105-¶106, ER65:¶115-ER66:¶117.
23
ER17.
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by a plaintiff against a website simply for allowing individuals from terrorist
organizations to access the website as a normal user.24
Where, like here, a website’s functionality is “designed to steer users based
on [unlawful] criteria,” its tools are not content-neutral and its behavior “differs
materially from generic search engines such as Google, Yahoo! and MSN Live
Search.” Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1167. Instead, the website has “designed its
system to use allegedly unlawful criteria so as to limit the results of each search, and
to force users to participate in its [unlawful] process,” and Section 230 does not
apply. Id.; Anthony, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1263 (Because [plaintiff] posits that Yahoo!'s
manner of presenting the profiles – not the underlying profiles themselves –
constitute fraud, the CDA does not apply.”) (emphasis added). The district court
was therefore in error and should be reversed.

See, e.g., Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1165 (plaintiffs asserted “that their claims
are based upon the fact that Google provides ISIS followers with access to powerful
tools and equipment to publish their own content” via Google’s website YouTube);
Fields, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1122 (plaintiffs’ claims were premised on a theory of
liability “based purely on Defendant’s knowing provision of Twitter accounts to
ISIS, not content created with those accounts.”); Cohen, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 157
(E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Plaintiffs argue that their claims seek to hold Facebook liable for
‘provision of services’ to Hamas in the form of account access ‘coupled with
Facebook's refusal to use available resources … to identify and shut down Hamas []
accounts.’”). Only one case, Gonzalez, advanced an argument that the website
actually developed additional content, but this was limited to targeted advertising
served on the website, generally, which is a far cry from the deliberate and specific
conduct challenged in this litigation. 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(rejecting the claim by plaintiffs “that Google acts as an ‘information content
provider’ [developing its own content] by placing targeted ads.”).
24
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2. The Website, Not Third-Party Users, Created the
Harmful Content Challenged By Plaintiff.
Second, because the harmful content and conduct challenged is the
recommendations functionality and push notifications, the district court was
incorrect in holding that “the users’ voluntary inputs…create the content on
Experience Project, not Ultimate Software’s proprietary algorithms.” Instead, those
“voluntary inputs” (like Margenat-Castro’s open advertisements for heroin) merely
contribute to Experience Project’s unlawful activity and content that Plaintiff
challenged in her complaint. Experience Project then took those heroin trafficking
posts, determined their precise and unlawful meaning, determined the intent of the
poster, and then elected to use those posts and similarly unlawful posts to entice
users whom they deemed a suitable (here, vulnerable) audience.

ER38:¶18-

ER45:¶35.
While Section 230 might preclude a claim against a website owner for
allowing heroin trafficking posts on their website, it does not follow that the website
is shielded from knowingly steering visitors towards that content and pressuring
those visitors to view and engage with the harmful posts. Roommates, 523 F.3d at
1165 (“[T]he fact that users are information content providers does not preclude
Roommate from also being an information content provider by helping ‘develop’ at
least ‘in part’ the information in the profiles.”) (emphasis original).
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In point of fact, the third-party poster has no control over the functionality that
is challenged in the Complaint. Margenat-Castro had no agency in what was shown
and recommended to Wesley Greer.

ER46:¶36-ER48:¶42.

Instead, the

recommendations-based content was chosen, packaged, and presented by
Experience Project. Id. This is precisely the type of “development…in whole or in
part” contemplated by Section 230 and contextualized in this Court’s holding in
Roommates. 521 F.3d at 1168 (the “definition of ‘development’ that is [most]
suitable to the context in which we operate [is the definition] ‘making usable or
available.’”).25

25

As with its analysis in the preceding section, the district court again relied on easily
distinguishable authority. ER17-ER18, citing Kimzey v. Yelp, 836 F.3d 1263 (9th
Cir. 2016); Goddard v. Google, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Kimzey
involved a pro se plaintiff bringing RICO and libel claims against a website over the
posting of a disparaging review from a disgruntled customer. 836 F.3d 1263 (9th
Cir. 2016). The Court noted that the plaintiff’s “complaint [was] far from lucid and
the opening brief cryptic to the point of opacity” and that the court was forced to
attempt to discern the plaintiff’s relevant arguments. Id. at 1268. First, the court
interpreted the plaintiff as claiming that Yelp, itself, wrote the disparaging review,
which the court deemed were “threadbare allegations” and dismissed pursuant to
Iqbal. Id. “The second, and more convoluted, [argument] is that Yelp transformed
the review…into its own ‘advertisement’ or ‘promotion’ on Google and featured a
unique star-rating system as the mantlepiece of its creation.” Id. at 1269. Ultimately,
it is unclear what the true allegations were in the case, much less how they might
have any bearing on Plaintiff’s underlying claims. Similarly, in Godard, plaintiffs
brought fraud claims arising from third-party ads placed on Google’s ad network.
640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009). In asserting that Google materially
contributed to the third-party advertisers’ fraudulent activity, the only alleged
collaboration between Google and the third parties was Google’s automated
suggestion of the phrase “free ringtone” when an advertiser sought to place adds
related to the word “ringtone.” Id. at 1197. The plaintiff “contend[ed] that the
36
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3. The District Court Relied on An Overly-Broad
Interpretation of Carafano—An Opinion Abridged by
Roommates—When It Held That Websites Cannot CoDevelop Content From Third-Party Posts.
Third, the district court erred in holding—with almost no analysis—that the
fact that Experience Project “collects information about users and classifies user
characteristics” was immaterial to its Section 230 analysis. ER18. Stating that
Experience Project “is immune, and not an ‘information content provider,’ as long
as users generate all content,” the district court supported its reasoning with
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003), an opinion
that is readily distinguishable, which predates Roommates and which, in point of
fact, required clarification from this Court in the Roommates opinion because of the
“unduly broad” language in its Section 230 analysis. 521 F.3d at 1171 (“We must…
clarify the reasoning undergirding our holding in Carafano[,] as we used language
there that was unduly broad.”).
In Carafano, the plaintiff sued a dating website after an unknown third party
created a false profile containing, inter alia, sexually suggestive content and her
phone number and address. 339 F.3d at 1121. This Court stated that the website
was immune from suit under these facts—it could not “be considered an

suggestion of the word ‘free,’ when combined with Google's knowledge of the
mobile content industry’s unauthorized charge problems, makes the Keyword Tool
neither innocuous nor neutral.” Id. (internal quotations, citations omitted).
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‘information content provider’ under the statute because no profile has any content
until a user actively creates it.” 339 F.3d 1124; compare ER18 (“The website is
immune, and not an ‘information content provider,’ as long as users generate all
content.”) (citing Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124).
In Roommates, this Court clarified that this was too broad a read of the statute
(although the result of Carafano was still appropriate under a much more cabined
read of Section 230’s scope). This Court observed that, in Carafano,
We correctly held that the website was immune, but
incorrectly suggested that it could never be liable because
“no [dating] profile has any content until a user actively
creates it.”
As we explain above…even if the data are supplied by
third parties, a website operator may still contribute to the
content's illegality and thus be liable as a developer.
Providing immunity every time a website uses data
initially obtained from third parties would eviscerate the
exception to section 230 for “develop[ing]” unlawful
content “in whole or in part.”
521 F. 3d at 1171 (internal citations omitted). Ultimately,
a more plausible rationale for the unquestionably correct
result in Carafano is this: The allegedly libelous content
there—the false implication that Carafano was unchaste—
was created and developed entirely by the malevolent user,
without prompting or help from the website
operator….The claim against the website was, in effect,
that it failed to review each user-created profile to ensure
that it wasn’t defamatory. That is precisely the kind of
activity for which Congress intended to grant absolution
with the passage of section 230. With respect to the
38
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defamatory content, the website operator was merely a
passive conduit and thus could not be held liable for failing
to detect and remove it.
Id. at 1171-72. It is indisputable that Carafano’s holding was cabined significantly
by the above language. The district court’s reliance on that opinion thus was
misplaced, given the fact that it failed to take into account the clarification (and
paring down) of the scope of Carafano’s holding, as explicitly articulated in
Roommates.
As stated above, Plaintiff’s claims against the website are not “in effect, that
it failed to review each user-created profile to ensure that it wasn’t [unlawful].” 531
F.3d. at 1171. Instead, Plaintiff’s claims are squarely grounded in how the “website
use[d] data initially obtained from third parties,” and arise from Experience Project’s
act of “‘develop[ing]’ unlawful content ‘in whole or in part.’” Id. (alteration
original).

Accordingly, the district court erred in its reliance on portions of

Carafano’s holding that are inconsistent with Roommates.
iii.

Plaintiff Plausibly Alleged Collusion Between Defendant
and Its Heroin-Trafficking User Base

Separately, the district court erred in applying Section 230 despite Plaintiff’s
plausible allegations of Defendant’s collusive activity with its criminal
accountholders. Specifically, Plaintiff contended that Experience Project could not
assert Section 230 immunity because it “developed” unlawful content via the
policies and procedures it had established—at least in part—with knowledge and
39
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endorsement of the illegal activity on its website, and with an intent to shield
criminal users from law enforcement requests.

ER18.

Beyond citing to the

website’s strict anonymity policy, Plaintiff also cited to a March, 2016,
announcement from the website that it was suspending operations, due to increased
requests from law enforcement. ER18-19. In an open letter to account holders,
Experience Project’s CEO stated:
From day one, privacy of our users has been
paramount, and we have never allowed names, phone
numbers, or addresses. This approach bucked every trend,
and challenged our ability to build an advertising-based
business, but we passionately believe it provided the
foundation for some of the most meaningful relationships
imaginable. And you are proof that we were right! But
there is no denying that the way people expect to use social
media today is markedly different than it once was, and as
the primary use has moved from web to mobile, our
hallmark attributes like long-form stories are not aligned.
But, there are deeper, and more troubling trends than
formats. Online anonymity, a core part of EP, is being
challenged like never before. Governments and their
agencies are aggressively attacking the foundations of
internet privacy with a deluge of information requests,
subpoenas, and warrants. We, of course, always support
proper law enforcement efforts, but the well-documented
potential for even abuse, even if unintentional, is
enormous, and growing.26
This statement makes it indisputable that Experience Project shuttered its website,
in no small part, because of law enforcement’s interest in its user’s activity. It is

26

See, also ER47:¶41
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equally indisputable that Experience Project viewed the actions of law enforcement
as “aggressively attacking the foundations of internet privacy with a deluge of
information requests, subpoenas, and warrants.”
The district court inferred the statement in the letter unfavorably to Plaintiff,
finding that “[t]his statement manifests a concern with Internet privacy that has been
widespread in the technology sector and does not establish antipathy towards law
enforcement especially given the statement about ‘proper law enforcement
requests.’” ER19. In choosing this interpretation, the district court ignored the fact
that the website’s CEO deemed himself arbiter of what is and is not a “proper” law
enforcement request and viewed the requests directed at his website as a “deluge of
information requests, subpoenas, and warrants” that “aggressively attack[ed] the
foundations of internet privacy.” These words plausibly demonstrate an antipathy
towards law enforcement or an interest in shielding users from the prying eyes of the
police, an inference the district court should have drawn in Plaintiff’s favor.
On a scanter record, courts have found a level of collusion sufficient that the
website’s posting policies and guidelines “developed,” in whole or in part, the
offending third-party content, and accordingly Section 230 did not apply. As
discussed above, in J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, three minor girls who
had been victims of human trafficking sued the website Backpage.com
(“Backpage”), which their pimps utilized to traffic the girls. 184 Wash. 2d 95, 359
41
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P.3d 714 (2015). In arguing that Section 230 did not apply to their claims against
Backpage, the young women pointed to the website’s posting guidelines, asserting
that the site’s “advertisement posting rules were ‘designed to help pimps develop
advertisements that can evade the unwanted attention of law enforcement, while still
conveying the illegal message.’”

Id. at 714.

Critically, the pimps posted

advertisements on the website “without any special guidance” or direct input from
Backpage personnel, but because the website’s posting guidelines prohibited posters
from using certain, coded language to signal underage prostitution (yet nonetheless
knew such human trafficking was occurring on its site), the plaintiffs argued that the
website provided cover for the pimps to engage in their unlawful and unspeakably
harmful activity. Id. at 716.
In an en banc opinion that relied extensively on this Court’s analysis in
Roommates, the Supreme Court of Washington held that it was enough, at the
pleadings stage, for plaintiffs to allege that Backpage was aware of the human
trafficking taking place on its website, and designed its posting guidelines to
facilitate this bad act (by giving pimps both anonymity and plausible deniability).
Id. at 717-18. Taking as true, inter alia, the plaintiffs’ allegations that Backpage’s
posting guidelines were “a method developed by Backpage.com to allow pimps,
prostitutes, and Backpage.com to evade law enforcement for illegal sex trafficking,
including the trafficking of minors for sex,” the court held that the website did “more
42
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than simply maintain neutral policies prohibiting or limiting certain content,” and
plaintiffs had plausibly alleged development of content sufficient that Section 230
did not apply. Id.
This readily analogizes to the facts at bar. Like the young girls in J.S., Plaintiff
identified Experience Project’s unlawful engagement and management of illegal
activity in the form of shielding bad actors (of whom it had actual knowledge) from
law enforcement review through its blanket anonymity policy and posting
guidelines.27 Going one step further than the plaintiffs in J.S., Plaintiff cited to
specific proof that, at least in part, the website’s policies were created and maintained
to give users cover from law enforcement, which Experience Project’s CEO
characterized as “aggressive[]” and “attacking the foundations of internet privacy.”
Plaintiff more than plausibly alleged collusion between Experience Project and its
drug-trafficking users, sufficient to demonstrate at the pleadings stage that the
website “contribute[d] materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.” J.S., 359
P.3d at 718 (2015) (quoting Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 1168).
Rather than an instance of a “clever lawyer argu[ing] that something the
website operator did encouraged the illegality,” the facts at bar and the behavior at
issue demonstrate an agency and intentionality on behalf of Experience Project that

27

See, e.g., ER34¶ 6-ER35:¶8, ER38:¶19, ER39:¶22-ER40:¶23, ER41:¶26ER48:¶42, ER50:¶52-¶53, ER55:¶70-ER56:¶71, ER56:¶73-ER57:¶74, ER61:¶94ER62:¶96, ER63:¶105-¶106, ER65:¶115-ER66:¶117.
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resulted in material contribution to profoundly bad acts, thereby removing Section
230 immunity. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1174-75. Because of the level of collusion
and misfeasance on the part of Experience Project, Section 230 immunity does not
apply and the district court should be reversed.
iv.

The District Court Erred in Holding That No Duty Was
Owed to Wesley Greer

In dismissing Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim, 28 the district court erred in
holding that Experience Project did not owe a duty of care to Wesley Greer, both
due to its own misfeasance and due to the general duty owed by a social media
website to its users.
1. Defendant’s Misfeasance Created a Duty Owed to
Wesley Greer.
Under California law, in determining whether a defendant owes a duty to a
plaintiff in a particular case, courts distinguish between misfeasance and
nonfeasance. See, e.g., Seo v. All-Makes Overhead Doors, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1193,
1202, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160 (2002). “Misfeasance exists when the defendant is
responsible for making the plaintiff's position worse, i.e., defendant has created a

28

Specifically, Plaintiff contended that Experience Project had actual knowledge of
the fact that Margenat-Castro was purporting to sell heroin on the website, when in
fact it was pure fentanyl, and that the website’s failure to warn Wesley Greer of this
fact led to his overdose and homicideER63:¶102-ER64:¶111. This Court holds that
Section 230 does not apply to failure to warn claims. Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc.,
824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. May 31, 2016).
44

Case: 18-15175, 06/13/2018, ID: 10907234, DktEntry: 12, Page 54 of 62
Dyroff v. The Ultimate Software Group – No. 18-15175

risk. Conversely, nonfeasance is found when the defendant has failed to aid plaintiff
through beneficial intervention.” Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 49, 123
Cal. Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36 (1975). In cases of misfeasance, the question of duty is
governed by the standards of ordinary care, i.e. “a person ordinarily is obligated to
exercise due care in his or her own actions so as not to create an unreasonable risk
of injury to others, and this legal duty generally is owed to the class of persons who
it is reasonably foreseeable may be injured as the result of the actor's conduct.” Lugtu
v. California Highway Patrol, 26 Cal. 4th 703, 716, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 28 P.3d
249 (2001). See also Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (“Everyone is responsible, not only for
the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by
his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or
person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought
the injury upon himself or herself.”).
Stating that Plaintiff simply “contend[ed] that [Experience Project] created a
risk of harm through its website functionalities and thus owed her son an ordinary
duty of care,” the district court held that Experience Project’s “use of the neutral
tools and functionalities on its website” did not rise to misfeasance.

ER26.

However, as stated in Sections VI.A.ii.1 and VI.A.ii.2, this mischaracterizes not only
the intentionality and effect of the challenged functionalities, but also Experience
Project’s own commitment to allowing illegal activity on its website. Where an
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entity knowingly identifies heroin addicts and knowingly steers them towards heroin
dealers, and where that same website intentionally seeks to hide that unlawful
behavior from law enforcement, it has created a risk through its own misfeasance.
Weirum,15 Cal. 3d at 49. Because the functionalities were not neutral, and because
Experience Project purposely sought to create an environment that shielded bad
actors, it owed a duty of care to Wesley Greer for the risk it helped create, and the
district court erred in holding otherwise.
2. California Law Recognizes a Special Relationship in
Circumstances Analogous to Social Media Websites.
As stated in Plaintiff’s Complaint, a social network like Experience Project,
with its business model of building and cultivating “communities” and “groups,” is
the twenty-first century equivalent of a brick and mortar business establishment. Just
like restaurants, bars, theaters, fairs, auditoriums, stadiums, amusement parks, and
all other businesses open to the public, Defendant enticed members of the public to
congregate on Experience Project website in furtherance of Defendant’s business
interest and in a manner entirely consonant with traditional concepts of public
gathering. Compl. at ¶¶ 88-91.
In defining the scope of the duty owed by a business establishment to its
invitees, the California Supreme Court stated that a “proprietor is…required to
exercise reasonable care for the[] safety [of invitees] and is liable for injuries
resulting from a breach of this duty.” Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc., 65 Cal. 2d
46
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114, 121, 52 Cal. Rptr. 561, 565, 416 P.2d 793, 797 (1966). The duty includes
“tak[ing] affirmative action to control the wrongful acts of third persons which
threaten invitees where the occupant has reasonable cause to anticipate such acts and
the probability of injury resulting therefrom.” Id.
Plaintiff’s position that a website is akin to a physical business finds support
in the law. In Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal.
2000), eBay sought a preliminary injunction to prevent another website from sending
“web crawlers” (programs that scan a website’s HTML code) to eBay’s website to
obtain information about the various auctions that were occurring at any given time.
One of eBay’s causes of action was trespass, and it illustrated this claim by
describing the defendant’s behavior “as equivalent to sending in an army of 100,000
robots a day to check the prices in a competitor’s store.” Id. at 1065. The court noted
that any distinction between eBay (a virtual store) and a brick and mortar store would
be “formalistic” and stated, in an explanatory footnote, that the modern trend was
moving from physical to online business. Id. at 1065, n.11. The court concluded
that the defendant’s behavior not only was a trespass, it was “more akin to the
traditional notion of a trespass to real property, than the traditional notion of a
trespass to chattels.” Id. at 1067 (emphasis added). A portion of the court’s analysis
rested on the fact that the information requests sent from defendant’s computers to
eBay’s servers were sufficiently “tangible” to equate to defendant’s physical
47
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presence (and thus interference) of eBay’s property. Id. at 1069 (“It appears likely
that the electronic signals sent by [the defendant] to retrieve information from eBay’s
computer system are . . . sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of action.”);
see also Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566-67, 54 Cal. Rptr.
2d 468, 473 (1996) (same); Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, 962 F. Supp.
1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (same); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393,
438 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Verio likely committed a trespass by using a search robot to
access Register.com's computer systems without authorization to do so.”) (citing
eBay, 100 F.Supp.2d at 1071, for the brunt of its analysis).
The same applies when an individual visits a website: when Wesley Greer
visited the Experience Project website, HTTP requests were sent by his browser to
Experience Project’s server and that quantum of physical presence and connection
was just as material in that moment as it was in eBay and the other, above cases. The
district court conceded that the reasoning in eBay was sound and that a physical
connection joined the parties—“[eBay’s] result makes sense: there was a threatened
physical incursion onto eBay’s website” (ER25:n.56)—but failed to explain why,
considering that parties physically “visit” websites when they load their content from
their servers, it does not follow that websites may (and should) be treated as physical
businesses.
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Nor was the district court correct in its analysis that “[r]isk can be more
apparent in the real world than in the virtual social-network world.” ER25. The
record is replete with allegations that Experience Project claimed to know the
meaning and intention behind every post of every user. ER38:¶18-ER45:¶35. If
anything, the district court’s logic militates in favor of Plaintiff’s position, since in
the brick-and-mortar world, a business establishment cannot monitor every single
invitee or encounter on its premises (yet has a duty to exercise ordinary care in doing
just that). In the virtual world, the opposite is true. A company like Experience
Project specifically designs its website to be a panopticon that mines, records,
analyzes and stores every interaction taking place on its premises. Id. Under the
district court’s logic, it would be unfair to brick-and-mortar establishments to hold
them to the same monitoring standards as social media websites. Not the other way
around.
Although incorrectly applied by the district court, the above case law,
analogizing websites to “brick and mortar” businesses for purposes of tort analysis
in the trespass context, resolves the doubts expressed by other courts tasked with
analyzing the relationship between websites and visitors, and acknowledging that
there is a lack of California law to resolve this “difficult question.” Doe v. Internet
Brands, No. 2:12-cv-3626-JFW (PJW), ECF. No. 51at *5 (C.D. Cal. November 14,
2016). Since a special relationship existed between Experience Project (a business
49

Case: 18-15175, 06/13/2018, ID: 10907234, DktEntry: 12, Page 59 of 62
Dyroff v. The Ultimate Software Group – No. 18-15175

proprietor) and its accountholder Wesley Greer (an invitee),29 a duty was owed. Id.
(“‘Special relationships’ that courts have found to trigger a duty to protect another
from foreseeable injury caused by a third party include…those between…business
proprietors…and their tenants, patrons, or invitees.”); accord Beckman v.
Match.com, No. 2:13-cv-00097-JCM-NJK, ECF No. 43, at *4 (Dist. Nev. March 10,
2017). The district court erred in reaching the opposite conclusion.
VII. CONCLUSION
Section 230 was not introduced to transform the internet into a lawless
vacuum in which the vulnerable are preyed upon and left with no recourse, yet this
is what the district court’s reading of Section 230 immunity achieves. This Court
made clear that such a result must be avoided:
The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of
communication that could easily be smothered in the
cradle by overzealous enforcement of laws and regulations
applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses. Rather, it has
become a dominant—perhaps the preeminent—means
through which commerce is conducted. And its vast reach
into the lives of millions is exactly why we must be careful
not to exceed the scope of the immunity provided by
Congress and thus give online businesses an unfair
advantage over their real-world counterparts, which must
comply with laws of general applicability.

29

See, Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566-67, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468,
473 (1996); Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D.
Ohio 1997); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 438 (2d Cir. 2004)
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Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.15. Plaintiff is both cognizant of and sympathetic
to Section 230’s goal to protect “Good Samaritan” websites from any liability they
might be exposed to in attempting to curb abuse across their service. But Plaintiff
is not trying to impose liability on good Samaritans. She is seeking to hold
Defendant liable for its own bad acts.
For the reasons stated herein, the district court’s decision should be reversed.
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